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"Every country seems to have a 'wage curve'." 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1994: 12) 
Abstract 
Blanchflower and Oswald argue in their 1994 book that there is a stable downward-sloping convex curve 
linking the level of pay to the local unemployment rate. They derived this so-called wage curve from measure-
ments on individuals within regions (local labour markets) for several countries and periods. Other investiga-
tors have confirmed the robustness of this finding. In this paper we seek evidence for the wage curve in New 
Zealand drawing on data at the regional level by means of the /996 census of population and dwellings. New 
Zealand research is hampered by the inaccessibility of unit record data and the paper reports results based on 
publicly available grouped data. The results show that a cross-sectional wage curve does exist in New Zea-
land. The elasticity is in the range of-0.07 to -0.12, which is similar to results obtained for other countries. 
However, research to date has not been able to choose between competing explanations for this phenomenon. 
We argue that a better understanding of the dynamics of local labour markets is an essential requirement for 
further study of the wage curve. 
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Descriptive studies ofregionallabour markets in New Zea-
land, such as Morrison (1997), show a remarkable diver-
sity in labour market outcomes across New Zealand re-
gions. This is not a new phenomenon. Already in 1989, the 
Population Monitoring Group of the New Zealand Plan-
ning Council discovered growing differences between re-
gions in terms of demographic and labour market charac-
teristics. A wide-ranging reform process that led to exten-
sive liberalisation of the New Zealand economy since 1984 
has been an important cause of growing regional diversity.1 
It is likely that the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) 1991 
has also made a significant contribution to growing regional 
diversity in levels of pay through the replacement of na-
tional awards with individual employment contracts and 
firm-specific (and therefore often location-specific) collec-
tive contracts. Yet the regional dimension is remarkably 
absent from analyses of the impact of the ECA at the macro-
level (Garter and Poot, 1999; Maloney and Savage, 1996) 
or at the mesa/micro level (Harbridge et al. 1997). 
At least three important factors have contributed to the lack 
of research and policy interest in regional economic out-
comes. The first is that New Zealand's structure of govern-
ance is strongly top-down oriented, with local government 
having limited instruments for economic policy while the 
mandate for regional government in this area has been re-
moved entirely, except for 'issues related to the Resource 
Management Act. The small size of New Zealand's popu-
lation is one possible justification for the centralised top-
down approach. 
Secondly, regional variations in average wages and prices 
were historically small and the current approach to regional 
issues may still be a reflection of this past. Thirdly, the 
convergence paradigm of orthodox neoclassical econom-
ics is currently the dominant doctrine for the formulation 
of sub-national policies in New Zealand. This paradigm 
suggests that diffusion of technologies, factor mobility and 
trade will operate as equilibrating forces in an open regional 
system, thus leading to a convergence in regional incomes. 
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There is some international evidence of such convergence 
among relatively homogeneous open regional systems. 
However, there is equally strong evidence that locational 
externalities (such as agglomeration advantages), spatial 
variations in population sizes and densities, accessibility 
differences, and path dependencies can all lead to diverg-
ing growth patterns. 2 
The idea of diverging regional development has not yet 
gained much support among New Zealand policy makers, 
but there has been a shift of regional policies from a focus 
on regional output (e.g. promotion of regional exports, pub-
lic consumption and transfers etc.) to a focus on regional 
inputs (education and training of the labour force, business 
development grants, entrepreneurial know how, infrastruc-
ture, R&D, etc.). In response to the greater emphasis on 
market forces, a devolution and privatisation of responsi-
bilities for regional development can now of course also 
be observed in many other countries (e.g. Nijkamp 1991). 
In New Zealand, a non-spatial business development policy 
has fully superseded regional development policy and it is 
now up to local authorities to develop their own initiatives 
in this new environment. Such initiatives could include the 
encouragement of new investment and inward migration, 
but at present such programs are very limited in scope (see 
Bevin, 1997). At the same time, there is substantial evi-
dence in the USA and elsewhere that territorial competi-
tion can be wasteful if there is no interregional co-ordina-
tion (Poot 1999). It is in this contemporary context that we 
turn our attention in this paper to the relationship between 
wages and unemployment at the regional level. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) argue that there is a sta-
ble downward-sloping convex curve linking the level of 
pay to the local unemployment rate. In earlier research that 
provided the foundations for their 1994 book, they called 
this relationship the wage curve (see Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1990). Blanchflower and Oswald derive wage 
curves from measurements on individuals within regions 
(local labour markets) for several countries and periods.) 
Other investigators using similar data - such as Blackaby 
and Hunt (1992), Winter-Ebmer (1996), Bratsberg and 
TUillnen (I 996), Kennedy and Borland (1997) and Janssens 
and Konings (1998) - have confirmed the robustness of 
this finding . However, Partridge and Rickrnan (1997) find 
evidence for a positive relationship between individual 
wages and local unemployment rates. Several time-series 
studies also suggest a long-run inverse relationship between 
the wage level and unemployment, see for example 
Johansen (1997) and Chiarini and Piselli (1997). Card 
(1995) provides a survey of the literature up to the mid 
1990's. 
In this paper we seek evidence for the wage curve in New 
Zealand drawing on data at the regional level provided by 
the 1996 census of population and dwellings. The paper 
has five sections. The next section provides a very brief 
review of theoretica1 arguments and predictions regarding 
the relationship between regional wages and unemploy-
ment. Sections three and four reports on the overseas and 
the New Zealand evidence to date: New Zealand research 
is hampered by the relative inaccessibility of unit record 
data, due to the high cost of using this information and 
stringent restrictions on the processing and analysing of 
the data.' Consequently, the paper reports results based on 
publicly available grouped data. Hence, this initial investi- · 
gation is quite exploratory but does raise a number of ques-
tions as to how local labour markets function in relation to 
the economy as a whole. The present analysis is a prelude 
to a full investigation oflocallabourmarketoutcomes with 
unit record data. Section five sums up and considers ideas 
for the next phase of the projecL 
Wages and unemployment: the arguments 
and evidence 
Internationally there are two quite different theoretical con-
jectures concerning the empirical relationship between 
wages and unemployment. The first argues that regions 
with high unemployment would also be ones with high 
wages (Hall 1970, 1972; Harris and Todaro 1970, Reza 
1978). This perspective is depicted in Figure la. The sec-
ond argues the reverse, namely that regions with high un-
employment will be the ones with low wages. This is the 
relationship that is referred to as the wage curve, and has 
been depicted in Figure lb. 
The central idea of the Harris-Todaro model is a version of 
Adam Smith's compensating differentials. Regions with 
high unemployment are less desirable places to live, other 
things being constant, because it is relatively difficult to 
find a job there. To keep workers in such areas wages have 
to be higher, i.e. the differential in net income due to job 
search costs and possible spells of unemployment must be 
compensated in spatial equilibrium.5 This is formulated in 
the Harris-Todaro model through the concept of expected 
income which is assumed to equal the wage multiplied by 
one minus the unemployment rate, that is, the wage times 
the chance of a job: E=W* (l-U).6 In the New Zealand 
context this implies that in regions like Northland or 
Gisborne where unemployment rates are high relative to 
the New Zealand average, real wages will have to be higher 
to compensate for the greater risk of unemployrnent.7 Simi-
larly, lower unemployment in the metropolitan regions of 
Auckland and Wellington would correspond with lower real 
wages. 
Both Hall (1972) and Harris and Todaro (1970) assume 
that, unless the expected return at a location is equal to the 
income available elsewhere, the worker will move. Since 
in long-run equilibrium each city must offer the same ex-
pected real income, pay and unemployment will be posi-
tively correlated in a cross-section of cities (and e.g. Hall 
provides some evidence using USA data from the 1960s).x 
The arguments behind the wage curve are more complex 
and invoke elements from several existing theories of wage 
setting behaviour, including efficiency wages (and notions 
of fairness in wage setting), insider-outsider effects in bar-
gaining and efficient labour contracting (Blanchflower and 
Oswa!d 1995, Card, 1995). 
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Figure 1. The relationship between wages and unemployment - alternative perspectives 
ReaiW 
a. Compensating differentials model 
The most intuitive idea behind the wage curve is that both 
pay and the tightness/slackness of the labour market (meas· 
ured here by the rate of unemployment) affect the workers 
motivation and, hence, productivity. In this efficiency wage 
interpretation of the wage setting process, a marginal rise 
in unemployment leads to a corresponding marginal fall in 
wages, because ftrms can reduce pay slightly while main-
taining a motivated work force (given that layoff would 
now be more costly for the worker). Conversely, "In a 
booming labour market, finns may have to pay well to en-
sure that individual workers, who know that there are many 
other jobs open to them, exert enough effort to work" 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994: 38). High wages also 
introduce greater urgency into the job search because of 
the higher opportunity cost of remaining unemployed. 
A similar phenomenon emerges when trade unions bargain 
on the workers' behalf. When rising unemployment leads 
to a larger proportion of union members facing a threat of 
layoffs, the union will moderate its wage demands and tilt 
its preferences towards a greater concern for jobs. There is 
ample evidence of such union behaviour in countries such 
as The Netherlands where union still have (indirectly) a 
large impact on wage setting (e.g. Garter and Pool 1999). 
In the efficient labour contracting model, which in its origi-
nal form dates back to Leontief ( 1946) and McDonald and 
So low (1981), employers and workers are concerned about 
both wages and employment. They bargain until an agree-
ment is reached from which neither party wants to deviate. 
The outcome is not unique (and depends on the relative 
bargaining strength of the parties), but can be shown to lie 
on an upward sloping curve in wage-employment space. 
Consequently, even when prices and technologies are the 
same across regions but bargaining situations vary, we may 
find that wage levels and employment levels are cross-
sectionally positively related. If higher employment trans-
lates into lower unemployment, the wage curve again 
emerges. 
Even when we accept the basic idea of an inverse relation-
ship between wages and unemployment, there ·is a ques-
ReaiW 
b . The wage curve 
tion of whether unemployment determines the wage level 
(as suggested by Blanchflower and Oswald) or the rate of 
change of wages, as suggested much earlier by the New 
Zealander (Bill) Phillips (1958). The theoretical justifica-
tion for the Phillips curve was first formulated by Lipsey 
(1960). These two competing ideas can be tested by nest-
ing both models in a general specification in which the 
change in wages is a function of present and past unem-
ployment rates (see Card 1995; Card and Hyslop 1996; 
Blanchard and Katz 1997), but this requires observations 
at more than one point in time. Because our New Zealand 
application provides only a regional cross-section at one 
point in time (1996), we do not pursue this idea further in 
the present paper. 
In summary we have two sets of arguments. The first set is 
driven by the fact that workers have migration alternatives, 
but says little about employer behaviour, and the second 
set has local unemployment conditions determining rela-
tive wage bargaining strengths but pays scant attention to 
migration and, hence, to the presence of other local labour 
markets.9 
The overseas evfdence 
Blanchflower and Oswald assemble a compelling raft of 
evidence for different countries in support of the wage curve 
and other researchers such as those referred to in the intro-
duction provided additional evidence. In many cases, the 
elasticity found in the wage-unemployment relationship has 
been quite similar, namely about~.l. Thus, a 10 percent 
rise in the unemployment rate would lead firms to pay 1 
percent less, cereris paribus. 
Recently, Campbell and Orszag (1998) provided a theo-
retical explanation for the apparent robustness of this re-
sult. Like many others, they see the wage curve as the re-
sult of local monopsony power of firms: when unemploy-
ment is high, finns do not need to pay as high a wage to 
retain their workers. Campbell and Orszag formalise this 
idea by fonnulating a variant on the dynamic etficiency 
wage model of Phelps ( 1994). Their key assumption is that 
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the workers' quit rate is positively related to the employ-
ment rate (1- U) with a constant elasticity h. In this case, 
different regions may be on different steady-state paths (and 
these paths are assumed unrelated! ), but the elasticity of 
the wage with respect to the employment rate turns out to 
be a function of only one parameter, namely h. The same is 
therefore true for the wage curve. It turns out mathemati-
cally that even policy variables such as taxes and wage sub-
sidies do not affect the elasticity of the wage curve. 
Yet the precise nature of the wage curve and its interpreta-
tion are by no means undisputed. For example, Partridge 
and Rickman (1997) suggest, after finding a positive rather 
than the expected negative relationship between wages and 
the unemployment rate on alternative US data, that it might 
be, "premature to expunge the Harris-Todaro compensat-
ing differentials model from regional economic analysis" 
(p. 281) and that, "more research should be conducted on 
the robustness of the wage curve" (ibid). 
New Zealand did not figure in Blanchflower and Oswald 's 
set of international examples (although Australia does). 
Morrison (1997) did find a weak positive correlation be-
tween the aggregate employment rate and average annual 
income of wage and salary earners across New Zealand 's 
14 regions, wlUch is consistent with the existence of a wage 
curve. 10 
The New Zealand case is of considerable interest for al-
though thi s small country has marked regional variations 
in its labour market conditions, it also has relative few im-
pediments to mobility so that sensitivity to compensating 
differentials can be expected to play a role in migration 
and regional labour market outcomes, (for example see 
Poot, 1986). On the other hand the post 1991 reforms, par-
ticularly those that encourage decentralised, individualised 
wage bargaining should work in favour of the local bar-
gaining model that underlies the wage curve. How these 
arguments play themselves out in this highly open economy 
raises a number of intriguing questions about the interna-
tional generality of the wage curve on one hand and its 
internal useful ness as an indicator of labour market behav-
iour within New Zealand on the other. 
The New Zealand evidence 
In this paper we seek evidence for the relationship between 
wages and unemployment using regional data available 
from the 1996 New Zealand census of population and dwell-
ings. The analysis is conducted not on the basis of obser-
vations on individuals but for groups of individuals who 
have location and some other characteristics in common. 
Specifically we provide estimates of the wage curve at the 
level of the urban area controlling for different composi-
tion effects. The results will not be directly comparable to 
those ofBianchflower and Oswald who use individuals and 
pool cross sections from several points in time, as do most 
authors who test these propositions. However, Partridge and 
Rickman (1997) uses data on groups and Kennedy and 
Borland (1997) analyse both individual records and grouped 
data. 
When data on individuals in pooled cross-sections are avai l-
able, the wage curve relationship can be formally eitpressed 
as follows: 
( I) R T 
lnW,n=a +f3lnU" +lfl X," +I 'fJ,L., +I A..P.,+E," 
s=2 u=2 
where, in very generallerms, in W;, is the natural log of !he 
average hourly wage _of individual i (= 1,2, .. ,N) living in 
region r (= 1,2, . .. ,R) at timet(= 1,2, .. ,T), lnU, is the natu-
ral log of the unemployment rate in region r at time t and 
X;" is a vector of attributes pertaining to the j lll individual 
living in region r at time t. In addition, the dummy vari-
ables L . ,(= 1 when s =rand 0 otherwise) andP~,(= 1 when 
u = t and 0 otherwise) refer to region and time dummy 
variables respectively (ie. fixed effect deviations from the 
general level term a). The coefficients a and {3 are single 
parameters to be estimated; v/ is a vector of parameters of 
which the length depends on the number of attributes in-
cluded; (/)~ and A .. are the fixed effects for regions and time 
periods respec ti ve ly and £;" is the error term 
(autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and the possible simul-
taneity of wage and unemployment determination can be 
taken into account). 
Note that it is assumed that the unemployment rate V n is 
the relevant measure of the slackness of the labour market 
for all in victuals for whom the model is estimated.lf differ-
ent groups of workers face different likelihoods of spells 
of unemployment, U" can be replaced by U;,• ie. the unem-
ployment rate pertaining to individual i. 
It is also possible to test whether the parameters of the model 
vary between groups of individuals. For example, Kennedy 
and Borland (1997) find that the wage curve relation ap-
pears stronger for female than male employees in Australia, 
but Janssens and Konings (1998) find the opposite in Bel-
gium. 
The models we are able to estimate here differ from the 
individual unit record case primarily in how the dependent 
variable is specified and in the nature of the controls we 
can impose. Our data do not refer to individuals but to 
groups of individuals who are enumerated at the time of 
the census according to where they li ve. In this case, the 
estimated relationship becomes: 
(2) _ _ R T 
lnW"=a+f3lnU,. +lfi'X" +I((J,L" +I A..P.,+E" 
s=2 u=2 
Here, W:. and x;., refer to ~ns calculated from groups of 
indi victuals. For example, Wrr measures the average annual 
income of all males in New Zealand (res iding in region r) 
who worked full time in a job paying a wage or salary in 
the four weeks preceding the March 5th census date of 
1996. 11 Full time refers to working thirty hours per week or 
more. Because we expect greater variation in hours worked 
among women than among men, even with the fulltime 
group as defined above, we restrict the analysis to males 
only. 
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The grouped data regressions have the econometric advan-
tage of having observations at the same level of aggrega-
tion at both sides of the equation. A potential problem with 
estimating equation (1) is that the unemployment rate is a 
group rate that is related to the observed wage of individu-
als. Moulton (1986) has shown that this may lead to a t-
statistic on the unemployment rate coefficient that is bi-
ased upwards. The "cell-mean" earnings regression model 
in equation (2) does not have this problem as long as the 
unemployment rate on the right hand side has been com-
puted for the same individuals as the average wage on the 
left hand side. However, using grouped data drastically re-
duces the number of available observations. 
The unemployment rate lnU., is the natural log of the 1996 
census unemployment rate of males in region r. The unem-
ployed are defined as persons who were not working in a 
paid job, business, farm or profession at the census date, 
but had looked for either full-time or part-time work in the 
preceding four weeks, regardless of their availability and 
the job search methods used. 12 
Because the reported income in the census refers to all 
sources of income rather than just wages and salaries paid, 
it is necessary to constrain the analysis to those occupa-
tions in which wages and salaries make up a substantial 
component of reported income. As Table 1 shows, of the 
23 occupations listed in the table, there are nine for which 
wage and salary earners represent more than 85 percent of 
the workers in that occupation (the others are primarily self-
employed). 
For the purpose of this exploratory analysis we have se-
lected four occupations, for which more than 85 percent of 
the workers are salary and wage earners: Office Clerks, 
Stationary Machine Operators and Assemblers, Industrial 
Plant Operators and Labourers and Related Elementary 
Service workers. 
Publicly available income information is reported in rather 
broad income classes. Average wage income for the four 
occupational groups was therefore calculated as follows. 
Mid points of the income categories of $10,000 and over 
were multiplied by the number of respondents in each cat-
egory. The sum of the resulting products was then divided 
by the total number of respondents involved. The open 
ended income category was assumed to be of the same width 
as the last closed interval. 
Relevant data were available for 39 urban areas in New 
Zealand. Ranging in size from a population of78,957 (Cen-
tral Auckland) to 2,382 (Greymouth), this set of major and 
minor urban areas is probably the closest standard statisti-
cal units in New Zealand come to what we understand by 
local labour markets. At the same time, there is consider-
able room for debating the separate identification of cer-
tain areas. One could argue for example that the four Auck-
land zones should be grouped into one large, metropolitan 
labour market, or that administratively separate urban ar-
eas such as Napier and Hastings function as one labour 
market, or that small urban areas such as Fielding might be 
Table 1. Occupations ranked by the 
proportion of wage and salary earners among 
full-time workers, New Zealand, 1996 
Occupation 
Teaching Professionals 
Legislators and Administrators 
Customer Services Clerks 
Office Clerks 
Proportion 
99.0 
94.4 
94.0 
93.8 
Personal and Protective Services Workers 90.2 
Stationary Machine Operators and Assemblers 90.0 
Industrial Plant Operators 
Physical Science and Engineering 
Associate Professionals 
Labourers and Related Elementary 
Service Workers 
Metal and Machinery Trades Workers 
Precision Trades Workers 
Salespersons, Demonstrators and Models 
Physical, Mathematical and Engineering 
Science Professionals 
Drivers and Mobile Machinery Operators 
Life Science and Health 
Associate Professionals 
Other Craft and Related Trades Workers 
Building and Related Workers 
Other Professionals 
Other Associate Professionals 
Life Science and Health Professionals 
Corporate Managers 
Building Trades Workers 
Market Oriented Agricultural and 
Fishery Workers 
Not Specified 
Total full time male earners 
89.4 
86.7 
86.0 
82.6 
82.3 
81.5 
81.4 
76.1 
72.4 
72.0 
70.1 
69.8 
69.5 
64.2 
60.9 
54.3 
42.7 
46.6 
70.9 
better linked with its larger neighbour Palmerston North. 
Each of these arguments has merits but in the absence of a 
systematic grouping of labour catchments throughout the 
country any such grouping can be as arbitrary as leaving 
the existing set untouched. We suspect that most of the key 
issues to emerge from this analysis do so independently of 
competing spatial configurations and therefore we will sim-
ply treat the urban area set as they come to us from Statis-
tics New Zealand.l3 
By pooling the urban area data for the four occupations 
described above, we are able to work with 39 x 4 = 156 
observations. The model we estimate is a variation on (2) 
in which we drop the subscript T ( we only use one time 
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Figure 2. Average annual income and the local unemployment rate for full time 
male wage and salary earners in selected occupations, 1996 
Fig 2a Office Clerks. 
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Fig 2b Stationary Machine Operators and Assemblers. 
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Figure 2 (cont.) Average annual income and the local unemployment rate 
for full time male wage and salary earners in selected occupations, 1996 
Fig 2c Industrial Plant Operators. 
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Fig 2d Labourers and Related Elementary Service Workers. 
Local male unemployment rate 
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Table2. Simple regression of annual income on the local unemployment rate 
for selected occupation, weighted least squares 
Occupation N 
Office Clerks 39 
Stationary Machine Operators 39 
and Assemblers 
Industrial Plant Operators 39 
Labourers and Related Elementary 39 
Service Workers 
Four occupations aggregated 156 
point, namely 1996) and in which the observations for the 
four occupational groups are pooled. Using this approach 
we turn to the New Zealand evidence. 
The uncontrolled plots of the reponed wage incomes of 
fulltime male workers against the male unemployment rate 
at the level of 39 major and minor urban areas in New Zea-
land is shown in Figure 2 for each of the four occupations 
separately. 
The scatters do not provide any convincing evidence of an 
inverse bivariate relationship between regional wage lev-
els and the corresponding unemployment rates. Yet when 
equation (2) is estimated by WLS in each of the four cases 
with no control variables imposed, there is a significant 
correlation for two occupations: office clerks and labour-
ers and related elementary service workers. Moreover, the 
elasticity of the wage curve (b in equation 2) is in both 
cases close to -0.1 as suggested by Blanchflower and 
Oswald. This can be seen from Table 2. 
Since the variables in the regression reflect group means 
rather than individual observations, the appropriate method 
of estimation is weighted least squares (e.g. Johnston 1984, 
pp. 293-296) and the weight used in this case was the 
number in the male labour force. 
The variables used were those that were considered rel-
evant and could be obtained from Statistics New Zealand 
by means of SUPERMAP (see Statistics New Zealand 
1995): see Annex. 14 The results are reported in Table 3. 
The first set of explanatory variables which were added to 
the simple linear regressions reported in Table 2 are those 
which follow from a tradition in estimating earnings func-
tions that commenced with Mincer's classic (1974) study. 
Mincer related the logarithm of earnings to schooling and 
to age (the latter in a non-linear way). Consequently, model 
I shows the results of explaining male wage and salary 
earnings in terms of the male unemployment rate (LUNM). 
the age distribution (G40 and G60) and the proportion of 
workers with no post-compulsory education (NOPOSTED). 
jJ R' F P-value 
0.-089 0.115 4805 0.035 
·0.040 0.020 0.769 0.368 
-0.026 0.002 0.067 0.797 
·0.115 0.168 7.460 0.010 
·0.067 0.013 2.028 0.156 
The model explains very little of the variance in earnings 
across regions and occupations, but the coefficients do have 
the right sign. The negative coefficient of LUNM is con-
sistent with the wage curve. The coefficient of G40 (the 
proportion of workers between 40 and 65) is positive and 
the coefficient of 060 (the proportion of workers aged be-
tween 60 and 65) is negative. Consequently, these variables 
provide some support for the usual concave age-earnings 
profiles in which earnings increase until, and peak at, mid-
dle ages and subsequently fall off in the years close to re-
tirement. Earnings are also lower when workers have lower 
levels of schooling, as is reflected in lower values of earn-
ings when the proportion with no post-compulsory educa-
tion in the region is higher. The coefficient for LUNM is 
similar to that found in the final row of Table 2, namely 
around -0.07. 
In the second model, we make a crude attempt to control 
for cost of living differences. There is no information on 
regional price levels collected in the census, but these price 
levels are expected to be correlated to rents paid by house-
holds renting dwellings. Information on rents paid is col-
lected in the census. As part of the economic policy re-
fonns in New Zealand, rents paid are generally market rents , 
even in public housing .L5 However, AVRENT does not 
appear to have any influence on wages paid. This can be 
seen from model 2, but the same remains true in the fuller 
specified models 3 to 5. The fact thatAVRENTis an insig-
nificant variable does not imply that regional cost of living 
differences do not matter in New Zealand. They may in 
fact be captured by the regional fixed effects that are in-
cluded in models 4 and 5. These regional fixed effects are 
significant in a number of cases. Indeed, the lower wages 
paid in some South Island regions may well be due to lower 
price levels in those regions. The available data do not per-
mit us to disentangle this effect from any other regional 
fixed effects. 
Model 3 provides a dramatically improved "explanation" 
of earnings. The adjusted R2 increases to 0.592. However, 
the improvement is entirely due to allowing for occupa-
tional fixed effects. The differences in wage levels between 
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occupations, ceteris paribus, may be due to compensating 
differentials for pleasantness of the work, occupational haz-
ards, differences in the allocation of the occupations across 
industries (given that wages vary across industries for a 
range of reasons, see e.g. Borjas 1996: 427-429), occupa-
tional segregation, etc. The simple model reported here 
does not explain any of these effects, but makes it clear 
that their joint effect is important. Besides now that the 
wage curve elasticity has become significant at the 5 per-
cent level, the age (040, but not G60) and education ef-
fec ts also become significant. The occupational effects are 
all positive, as they are measuring wages relative to those 
of labourers and elementary service workers, who have the 
lowest wages ofthe occupations considered. The elasticity 
of the wage curve is about -0.07, as before. 
The model which includes regional specific effects (model 
4) is an improvement on model3. The fit improves further 
and Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is also lower, 
although Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is higher.16 
The regional effects that are significant are located in the 
South Island (Nelson, Canterbury and Otago), except for 
Table 3. New Zealand estimates of the wage curve, based on group data 
N= !56; Weighted Least Squares 
Dependent variable: LW AGE 
Weights used: MALELF 
Model 
LUNM -0.068 (0.048) 
040 0.008' (0.005) 
0 60 -0.061 (0.063) 
NO POSTED -0.003 (0.002) 
AVRENT 
OFFICEC 
STATM 
INDPO 
NORTil 
WAlK 
BAYOP 
OISB 
HAWKB 
TARA 
MANA 
NELS 
CANT 
OTAOO 
SOUTH 
WEST 
LUNMOC1 
LUNMOC2 
LUNMOC3 
CONSTANT 10.353 
Adj.R' 0.011 
AIC 0.021 
SBC 0.023 
Standard errors in parentheses 
~Significant at the I% level 
~ Significant at [he 5% level 
4 
-0.071 (0.049) -0.071' (0.031 ) -0.068' (0.039) -0.115' (0.063) 
0.007 (0.006) 0.007' (0.004) 0.012" (0.004) 0.012" (0.004) 
-0.057 (0.065) -0.057 (0.04 1) -0.13 ]' (0.050) -0.131' (0.051 ) 
-0.004 (0.002) -0.004' (0.002) -0.004' (0.002) -0.004' (0.002) 
-0.0001 (0.0005) -0.0001 (0.0003) -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0005) 
0.285' (0.02 1) 0.285' (0.019) 0.231 (0.172) 
0.155" (0.021) 0.155' (0.019) -0.003 (0.172) 
0.242' (0.021) 0.242" (0.019) 0.054 (0.172) 
0.019 (0.064) 0.019 (0.065) 
0.030 (0.035) 0.030 (0.035) 
0.007 (0.038) 0.007 (0.038) 
-0.040 (0.077) -0.040 (0.078) 
-0.036 (0.043) -0.036 (0.043) 
0.064 (0.060) 0.064 (0.060) 
-0.074' (0.039) -0.074' (0.040) 
-0.096' (0.054) -0.096' (0.054) 
-0.055' (0.032) -0.055' (0.033) 
-0.145' (0.046) -0.145" (0.047) 
0.071 (0.065) 0.071 (0.065) 
-0.037 (0.119) -0.037 (0.119) 
0.026 (0.081) 
0.075 (0.08 1) 
0.089 (0.081) 
10.409 10.238 10.340 10.440 
0.004 0.592 0.644 0.641 
0.021 0.009 0.008 0.009 
0.024 0.0 11 0.013 0.014 
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the Manawatu region. The results suggest that wages paid 
are generally lower in the South Island. One contributing 
factor may be that the South Island has a far lower popula-
tion density than the North Island. The absence of agglom-
eration advantages and the presence of higher transporta-
tion costs may lead to lower labour productivity, all else 
being equal, which is ultimately reflected in lower wages. 
The final model, model V, tests whether the elasticity of 
the wage curve varies between the four occupational groups 
considered. The coefficients of the interaction effects 
LUNMOCI, LUNMOC2 and LUNMOC3 are all insignifi-
cant. However, they are all positive and provide therefore 
some tentative evidence that the wage curve is more elas-
tic for the rather unskilled labourers than for the other oc-
cupational groups. Kennedy and Borland (1997) found in 
their disaggregate analysis for Australia that the wage curve 
elasticity did not appear to vary in any systematic manner 
with educational attainment and that the wage curve rela-
tionship was only significant for a small subset of occupa-
tional groups. 
Future research 
We have found evidence that the wage curve relationship 
does hold in New Zealand and that the unemployment elas-
ticity of pay is between about -0.07 and -0.12. In this re-
spect, our brief New Zealand study appears to provide one 
more supporting piece of evidence for an empirical eco-
nomic phenomenon for which there is a remarkable degree 
of consensus internationally. Indeed, Card's (1995) review 
of research on the wage curve suggests that the existence 
of such a curve is no longer disputed, but that the reason 
for the negative correlation between the wages of individu-
als and the local unemployment rates are not clear despite 
various conjectures that have been offered. 
Therefore, an important objective for future New Zealand 
work is to contribute to the international research in this 
area by shedding light on the causes of the cross-sectional 
regularity. The key issue here is the dynamics of the local 
labour market, an issue ignored in most previous research 
on the wage curve. Specifically, in future papers we will 
investigate whether the wage curve is due to a sorting of 
workers across regions (by means of internal migration and 
labour supply responses) such that high wage workers are 
overrepresented in low unemployment regions. Formal 
econometric models of New Zealand internal migration 
have been estimated in the past (e.g. Poot 1986), but there 
has been no analysis of internal migration with micro-level 
data. Alternatively, the wage curve could result from chang-
ing bargaining outcomes over the regional business cycle: 
workers residing in particular regions finding their wage 
growth lower as the unemployment rate rises. 
The two hypotheses will be tested in future work by means 
of unit record data from the 1991 and 1996 NZ Census of 
Population and Dwellings. This permits estimation of the 
cross-sectional wage curve at both points in time. Wage 
equations are based on conventional human capital theory 
and will include age, schooling and other personal charac-
teristics. Industry and occupation effects will also be in-
vestigated. However, the dynamics of the relationship be-
tween wages and local unemployment rates are identified 
by cohort analysis. Since there are as yet no longitudinal 
labour market data in New Zealand, such data are syntheti-
cally generated by identifying homogeneous cohorts in the 
1991 census and then by finding the matching observa-
tions in the 1996 census. This enables the computation of 
wage growth for the "stayers" , which can be compared 
with the change in the regional unemployment rate. If the 
wage-unemployment relationship remains robust to this first 
differencing, it confums bargaining models of local wage 
setting. If the wage curve breaks down in the dynamic con-
text, it suggests that supply responses such as changing la-
bour force participation and geographical mobility are re-
sponsible for observing the cross-sectional wage and em-
ployment outcomes. 
Although positioned adversarily it may be counterproduc-
tive to continue to think in terms of two competing theo-
retical models; of Harris and Todaro arguing for a positive 
rel ationship between wages and unemployment and 
Blanchflower and Oswald for a negative relationship. As 
Blanchflower and Oswald themselves note, the Harris and 
Todaro model can sit comfortably alongside the wage curve 
- it is the permanent value of pay and joblessness that will 
be positively related across the regions in a long run equi-
librium17 whereas the contemporaneous pay and jobless-
ness will be negatively related (permanent values can be 
positively related while movements around the mean are 
negatively related).1A The difference between the behav-
iour or permanent and transitory components of both wages 
and unemployment has received little attention in the lit-
erature. Future work will attempt to disentangle these com-
ponents, as well as focus on micro-level behaviour of firms 
and workers in regional labour markets. 
Notes 
* Paper prepared for rhe 38rh Annual Meeting of the West-
em Regional Science Association, Ojai, California, Feb-
ruary 21-24, 1999. This research is supported by VUW 
Faculty of Commerce and Administration Grant 
7008054. Research assistance was provided by Katja 
Kleinveld and Glen Thicken. Rainer Winkelmann (Uni-
versity of Canterbury) and Dean Hyslop (The Treas-
ury) provided helpful comments. 
See Evans et al. (1996) for a survey of the New Zea-
land reform process, Maloney and Savage (1996) on 
the labour market impact, and Le Heron and Pawson 
( 1996) on regional trends and issues. 
See Nijkamp and Poet (1998) for a survey. 
Specifically, they estimated wage curves with data from 
12 countries: USA, Britain, Canada, South Korea, Aus-
tria, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Ire-
land, Australia and Germany. 
4 Unit record data from official government surveys such 
as the Census of Population and Dwellings are in New 
Zealand only available through the so-called Statistics 
Labour; Employment and Work in New Zealnnd 1998 105 
106 
Laboratory of Statistics New Zealand. The computer 
processing must be done on the premises of Statistics 
New Zealand. For confidentiality reasons, procedures 
are in place that prevent the reporting of information 
on individual records and all output from analyses is 
checked against the conditions stipulated in the StatiS· 
tics Act. 
In the growing regional economics literature on corn· 
pensating differentials is it not just unemployment that 
matters, but cost of living and the value of(dis)amenities 
as welL See for example Roback (1982) who argues 
that regional wage differences can be explained largely 
by these local attributes. This is reflected in relating the 
real wage rather than the nominal wage to the unem· 
ployment rate in Figure 1. 
However, as noted by e.g. Borjas ( 1996: 217), thecom· 
pensating differential would vanish when workers are 
covered by taxpayer·financed unemployment insurance. 
In a slightly more formal statement of the argument: 
"in a multi-regional labour market, equilibrium is at· 
tained when expected utility is equalized across a11 re· 
gions and net migration between regions equals zero" 
(Partridge and Rickrnan, 1997: 277). 
8 Support may also be found in Reza (1978), Marston 
(1985).and in Topel (1986). 
9 There is another approach based on the idea that there 
may be differences between regional labour markets in 
the extent to which wages and employment will respond 
to disequilibrium, see for example McCormick and 
Sheppard (1992). 
lO The correlation coefficient was 0.36. 
11 It is possible for someone to live in one region and work 
in another. We simply assume here however that the 
usual place of residence appropriately approximates the 
boundaries of the relevant local labour market. 
12 The definition of "looking for work" was contained in 
the guide notes and required at least one of the job search 
methods listed, during the four weeks preceding the cen· 
sus. If "looking at job advertisements in newspapers" 
was one of the methods cited, at least two methods are 
required. (Statistics New Zealand 1995). 
13 Main urban areas are very large non-administrative cen· 
tres which are urban in character and have a minimum 
population of 30,000. They may be part of a city or 
parts of cities and/or part of a district or parts of dis-
tricts. Minor urban areas are small to medium-sized 
non-administrative centres which comprise pan of a 
district, are regarded as urban in character and have 
populations ranging between 1,000 and 9,999 (Statis· 
tics New Zealand, 1995). 
14 The data are available upon request from the authors. 
15 Households with low incomes may be given a limited 
accommodation grant to supplement their income (see 
Morrison, 1995). 
16 See e.g. Ramanathan 1989, p.I66 for a description 
ofthese model selection criteria. 
17 Because migration generates heavy short run costs; it 
is closer to an investment decision than to a consump-
tion decision. Therefore migrants' choices are not likely 
to respond to transitory movements in economic con· 
ditions which may affect their wage determination in 
situ (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994: 93). 
18 See Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, page 93, footnote 
21. 
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Annex: Definition of the variables used 
Mnemonic Variable Description 
LWAGE Natural log of the average This refers to income from a variety of different sources, not just 
annual income of fulltirne wages and salaries. Measuring income before tax of persons 15 
male wage and salary years and over received from all sources for the financial year 
earners. ending 31 March 1996. This includes income from : wages, salary, 
commissions, bonuses paid by employer, self-employment, or 
business(es) owned and worked in , interest, dividends, rent, other 
investments, ACC regular payments, New Zealand Superannua-
tion, pensions, annuities, unemployment benefit, sickness benefit. 
invalids benefit, student allowance, other government benefit, 
government income support payments, or war pensions. Wages 
and salary earners are the largest of three categories of 'employ-
mem status' used in the census; the other two are self employed 
(with or without employees) and unpaid labour. 
MALELF The number of males in the This is the number of male employed (E) plus the male unem-
labour force. played (U). This is used to weight the grouped observations for 
each urban area. 
LUNM Natural log of the unem- Unemployment rate= U/(U+E) where U is the definition of 
ployment rate of males unemployment as used in the census and E refers to all employed 
only. (wage and salary earners plus the self employed - with and 
without employees, together with unpaid workers). 
G40 The proportion of all wage 
and salary earners who are 
aged between 40 and 65. 
G60 The proportion of all wage 
and salary earners who are 
aged between 60 and 65. 
NO POSTED The proportion of males in This variable proxies the average education level of the workers 
fulltime paid work with no considered iri the regression models. 
post secondary school 
qualification 
AV RENT The average rents of all This variable is used as a proxy for cost of Jiving, a practice with a 
rented dwelling units in number of precedence in the literature, see for example Winter-
1996 Ebmer (1996: 428). See Blackaby et al (1991) for a strong argu-
ment for the incorporation of regional prices to make sure that real 
wages are adequately defined in cross-sectional studies. 
OFFICEC A dummy variable identify- An occupational fixed effects. The coefficient measures the 
ing Office C1erks influence of the specific occupation on wages relati ve to 
Labourers and Related Elementary Service Workers. 
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Annex (cont.) 
STATM A dummy variable identify-
ing Stationary Machine 
Operators and Assemblers 
INDPO A dummy variable identify-
ing Industrial Plant 
Operators 
NORTH A dummy variable identify- A regional fixed effects. The coefficient measures the influence of 
ing the Northland region lhe specific region on wages relative to the Auckland and 
Wellington metropolitan areas. 
WAIKA A dummy variable identify-
ing the Waikato region 
BAYOP A dummy variable identify-
ing the Bay of Plenty region 
GISB A dummy variable identify-
ing the Gisborne region 
HAWKB A dummy variable identify-
ing the Hawke's Bay region 
TARA A dummy variable identify-
ing the Taranaki region 
MANA A dummy variable identify-
ing the Manawatu region 
NELS A dummy variable identify-
ing the Nelson region 
CANT A dummy variable identify-
ing the Canterbury region 
OTAGO A dummy variable identify-
ing the Otago region 
SOUTH A dummy variable identify-
ing the Southland region 
WEST A dummy variable identify-
ing the Westland region 
LUNMOCl LUNM x OFFICEC This variable measures whether the wage curve elasticity is 
different for Office Clerks as compared with Labourers and 
Elementary Service Workers 
LUNMOC2 LUNMx STATM A wage curve elasticity effect for Stationary Machine Operators 
and Assemblers 
LUNMOC3 LUNMx iNDPO A wage curve elasticity effec t for Industrial Plant Operators 
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